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ABSTRACT 
A wide range of evidence confirms that in markets characterized by high informational 
uncertainty a firm’s status position is a signal of that firm’s quality, and that resource 
holders are more likely to select and invest in high status firms. The central question of 
this paper is if status as a signal of the quality of the firm remains relevant when more 
informative data about the firm’s performance becomes public, and if so how is a firm’s 
status affecting market reaction to new information.  
 
To answer this question I draw from status literature, economics of information and 
signalling, and from decision making theory. I propose that under uncertainty investors 
are attentive to status as a signal of quality, but once new information becomes public 
there is a shift in attention from the content of the signal to the accuracy of the signal. I 
also propose that the perceived accuracy of the signal is positively correlated with the 
status position and that the reaction to surprises depends on the perceived accuracy. As a 
result the magnitude of the market reaction to new information is moderated by the status 
of the firm.  
 
I use this framework to analyze a phenomenon which has generated a wide debate across 
disciplines, that is the reaction to earnings announcements released by public firms at the 
end of the financial periods. I provide evidence that status magnifies the reaction to 
surprises by showing that the return on the stock of high status firms which deliver 
negative (positive) surprises is lower (higher) than the return on the stock of lower status 
firms which deliver similar results.  
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The image of markets as socially constructed structures is one of the crucial 
insights that sociology has contributed to the understanding of economic activity (Blau 
1964, Granovetter 1985, White 1981). One of the most compelling ideas growing from 
this body of research is that actors’ position in the social structures determines their 
opportunities and constraints by shaping others’ beliefs and actions toward them. A wide 
range of evidence confirms that social status is one of the key sources of differentiation in 
markets and that a high status position confers advantages and influence that often extend 
beyond the actor’s specific competencies (Podolny 1993, Benjamin and Podolny 1999, 
Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999). The existing literature proposes that this phenomenon is 
the consequence of a generalized assumption that status is a signal of quality. The most 
pervasive mechanism that explains the link between the status of an actor and its quality 
is association with prominent partners (Blau 1964:67, Podolny and Philips 1996, Stuart, 
Hoang and Hybels 1999, Podolny 2001, Higgings and Gulati 2003, Washington and 
Zajac 2005). Since most markets are characterized by informational uncertainty 
concerning the true worth of a firm market participants look at a firm’s relationships and 
assume a positive correlation between the quality of the firm and the prominence of its 
partners. The more prominent its partners are, the higher the status of the firm and 
consequently, the higher the perceived quality.  
While the metaphor of status as signal of quality provides a useful framework for 
explaining the discrepancy in advantages accrued to high status firms in settings 
characterized by high informational uncertainty it is not clear if status plays any role once 
information about the actual performance of the firm becomes public. This gap is 
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characterizes most markets. Even more puzzling is the fact that current theories propose 
contradictory answers to the question.    
Sociological theory of status suggests that new information is often 
inconsequential for status hierarchies and that, at the limit, the benefits of a high status 
position will prevail. Indeed the prevalent view is that a status position is relatively sticky 
(Podolny 2005) and therefore transitional events do not matter too much. The underlying 
assumption is that market participants are rather slow to recognize shifts in quality and 
therefore, at any given time, the relation between status and quality is quite loose 
(Podolny 1993). This leaves most of the prestige of the firm in the hands of its partners 
which tend to perpetuate the status-quo. A connected argument is that high status actors 
have access to a perpetual “reservoir of goodwill” (Jones et al. 2000) or “credit” 
(Hollander 1958, Blau 1964) which allows them more freedom of action, even if some of 
their actions have negative effects. Additional evidence from the sociology of deviance 
compounds the puzzle even further. While in some instances high status actors who 
violate group norms receive more severe sanctions than their low status peers, in other 
cases their crimes are treated with more lenience (Rosoff 1989, Shaw and Skolnick 1996, 
Wiggins, Dill and Schwartz 1965).    
Sociological evidence stands however in opposition with the view of economics 
of information and decision making which proposes that when more informative data 
about an actor’s quality becomes available the weaker signal used to assess quality 
receives less attention or becomes irrelevant (Milgrom and Weber 1982, Alles and 
Lundholm 1993). Under this view status plays no significant role once information about 
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of news. Concretely, a firm which reveals positive news about its performance will see its 
stock price increase, while a firm with negative news is likely to witness a fall in the price 
of its stock (Milgrom 1981) but the status of the firm will not affect the investors’ 
reaction.    
However, finding an answer to the question concerning the role of status when 
information about performance becomes public is important for a number of reasons. 
First, existing evidence shows that information from high status actors is often treated 
differently and that both under- and overreaction to information is present. Second, new 
information provided by firms is often re-interpreted and re-packaged by other market 
actors, actors which often are also responsible for the construction of status hierarchies 
(Zuckerman 1999, Basuroy, Chatterjee, Ravid 2003, Hsu 2006). In fact, firms often 
complain that they are victims of financial analysts, media or other information providers 
and mediators (Solomon and Frank, 2003). Third, because of the interconnection between 
market performance and status accumulation (Shipilov and Li 2008) even a short term 
reaction to new information about the firms’ performance can have considerable 
consequences for the status hierarchy. Consequently, by understanding the connection 
between performance and status we can account better for changes in status hierarchies. 
From a strategic point of view it is important for firms to know if relevant stakeholders 
react differently to information coming from firms of different social status; by knowing 
this, firms are more likely to pay attention to the type of information and the timing so 
that they can ensure the highest benefits and the least sanction, respectively.      
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observed under uncertainty change as a result of new information about performance  I 
develop a theoretical framework and derived hypotheses about the likely market reaction 
to new information for firms from different status strata. My argument builds on the 
relational character of a status position (Podolny 1993). More precisely, I argue that a 
firm’s partners have a double role. On one hand they render status to the firm, by 
allowing their connection to the firm to be visible (ties as prisms, Podolny 2001) and on 
the other hand they create specific expectations about the firm’s quality by indicating the 
type and performance range that we should expect from the endorsed firm (Ruef and 
Scott 1998, Durand, Rao and Monin 2007). To explain how a firm’s status position 
influences reaction to new information I develop an attention shift hypothesis. My 
proposition is that under uncertainty investors are attentive to the content of status as 
signal of quality, but once new information becomes public there is a shift in attention 
from the content of the signal to the accuracy of the signal. I also propose that the 
perceived accuracy of the signal is positively correlated with the status position and that 
the reaction to new information depends on the perceived accuracy. As a result, the 
magnitude of the reaction to new information which departs from expectations (surprises) 
also depends on status.  
I use this framework to analyze a phenomenon which has generated a wide debate 
across disciplines, that is the reaction to earnings announcements released by public firms 
at the end of the financial periods. To document the difference in market reaction to new 
information about firms of different social standings my strategy is to compare the 
market response to earnings announcements issued by firms of higher and lower status at 
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1 I provide evidence that the reaction to surprises is larger for 
high status firms by showing that the return on the stock of high status firms which 
deliver negative (positive) surprises is lower (higher) than the return on the stock of lower 
status firms which deliver negative (positive) surprises.  
 
Status as signal of quality under uncertainty  
  Although specific definitions vary (Gould 2002, Podolny 1993, Washington and 
Zajac 2005) the term status typically refers to the prestige associated with a position in 
the social structure. In organizational theory and strategy status is usually operationalized 
by analyzing patterns of relations of the focal actor such that the actor with the most 
prominent partners relative to its peers is assigned to the highest status position (Podolny 
and Phillips 1996). Regardless of its origins, ascribed or achieved, a status position at any 
given moment determines an actor’s opportunities and constraints by shaping others’ 
beliefs and actions toward the actor. A range of empirical findings confirms that status 
plays a significant role in situations in which it is difficult to acquire accurate information 
about an actor’s performance, to the point where a status position can easily become “an 
element of identity overriding her actions as a base for establishing her identity” (Phillips 
and Zuckerman 2001). Likewise, in the absence of accurate information about a firm its 
status represents an appropriate signal of quality (Podolny 2005). At the limit, a high 
status firm becomes a token for quality and reliability, regardless of the actual work done 
for clients (Uzzi and Lancaster 2004).  
                                                 
1 The status of the firm is function of analysts’ coverage. The more highly regarded analysts cover the stock 
of the firm, the higher its status. This view, consistent with the image of status in mediated markets 
(Zuckerman 1999, Hsu 2006), is developed in the next sections.     
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direct result of the pattern of ties secured and sustained by the firm. In general a pattern 
of relation with highly regarded partners is seen as a guarantee that the focal firm will 
deliver products of higher quality than its peers. Not only are prominent endorsers more 
likely to have the knowledge and ability to pick the firms with best prospects (Stuart 
1998), but they also monitor the firms and are more likely to withdraw their support if the 
quality is falling (Jensen 2006). Podolny (2005) validates the idea that the status of a firm 
is “at the discretion of the third parties who are aware of the exchange” by showing that 
at high levels of uncertainty high status banks do not want to be seen doing business with 
low status peers.  
The received argument that status is a signal of quality is contingent on 
uncertainty, such that the greater the uncertainty about a market player the more the 
market participants will rely on status to make inferences about the quality of their 
product (Podolny 2005). A number of empirical applications have confirmed this 
argument. For example, Higgings and Gulati (2003) show that young firms associated 
with high status actors are more likely to attract the endorsement of a prestigious 
investment bank, and that the effect is more dramatic when the firm is in an earlier 
product stage. Similar effects are documented for young biotech companies undergoing 
IPO by Stuart et al. (1999) who show that the impact of endorsers’ prominence on firm’s 
value increases with the level of uncertainty surrounding the firm.  
If the role of status hinges on uncertainty, it would be safe to assume that once 
relevant information becomes public status’ role becomes less important. This is exactly 
the perspective proposed in economics of information and decision making which states 
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signal used to assess quality receives less attention and becomes irrelevant (Milgrom and 
Weber 1982, Alles and Lundholm 1993).
2 More precisely, we should expect that the 
reaction to information will only depend on its nature and not on status.  
To test the effect of status position once new information about the firm becomes 
public I advance the following (competing) hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1a: As new information about firm performance becomes available (i.e. the 
uncertainty about firm performance diminishes) the positive role of status is preserved.  
Hypothesis 1b:  As new information about firm performance becomes available the 
positive role of status is disappears.  
Evidence from the sociology of deviance literature suggests however that 
considering only these hypotheses would be too simplistic.  
 
Status Quality and Status Deviance  
One of the central propositions in the literature on status deviance is that the 
confidence of the market in the superior quality of high status firms is high enough to 
allow them to challenge the customs of their field more than their low status peers 
(Holander 1958, Blau 1960, Phillips & Zuckerman 2001, 2007). The same literature also 
shows a significant difference in the magnitude and types of sanction applied to high 
status and low status actors. The relevance of this evidence to the question concerning the 
role of status in information processing is straightforward. If the market reacts differently 
                                                 
2 Milgrom and Weber show that if a seller makes public information about the value of her asset, the profit 
of the buyer who observes some private signal correlated with the value of the asset falls. Alles and 
Lundholm contend that as public information becomes available the willingness of a trader to acquire a 
private signal decreases.  
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position in a status hierarchy moderates the way information about an actor is received. 
However, although there seems to be agreement over the fact that high status actors are 
more likely to deviate, the existing literature has not resolved the issue of the likely 
reaction to deviance. In some cases high status actors receive more severe penalties, in 
some other cases their high status seems to work as a shield which helps them weather 
bad times (Wahrman 1972, 1977, Gouran, Ketrow, Spear, Metzger 1984, Rosoff 1989, 
Shaw and Skolnick 1996, Wiggins, Dill and Schwartz 1965).  
An easy resolve to this debate is to point toward methodological difficulties and 
questionable experimental conditions, as done in some of the studies just cited, and to 
spell out a number of boundary conditions which have not been properly accounted for 
(see Giordano 1983 for a review). Another approach is to consider that the mediating 
effect of status on has not been adequately theorized. The latter approach is favored by 
Phillips and Zuckerman (2007) who identify a certain class of norms which the high 
status player are expected to always respect, else they will incur the most severe 
punishment. Phillips and Zuckerman call them “quality norms” and define them as 
“actions that are proscribed because they contradict the standards the audience uses to 
assess quality”. 
3
While Phillips and Zuckerman (2007) make a major contribution in linking the 
central claim of status theory, namely that status is a signal of quality, to the reaction to 
                                                 
3 The other class is represented by “membership norms” and refers to actions that will help an actor to 
demonstrate membership to a group or category. Because high status actors have no need to demonstrate 
category membership their deviation from this class of norms is not sanctioned. However, because their 
status is seen as a signal of superior quality when high status actors ignore quality norms they incur more 
severe sanctions.  
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question why and how the status effects observed under uncertainty change as a result of 
new information. The reason is because their framework and the literature that inspired 
them is mainly designed to answer the question whether high status actors are more likely 
to conform or deviate from norms than their low status colleagues and the connected 
question why the magnitude of the punishment varies with the position in the status 
hierarchy.  
However, most of the new information in markets is not about revealing 
deviations from norms, but about performance. Although in some cases normative 
conformity is a perquisite of good performance (cite neo-institutionalism) the two are 
quite different. While proving norm violation, especially for high status firms, requires an 
interpretative effort from the part of the observer (Giordano 1983) market performance is 
relatively straightforward. Moreover, while norm infringement is a negative aspect, a 
great deal of news is about positive facts. Yet, so far we do not have an established way 
to theorize the status effects if the news is positive. Finally, while showing how 
information about norm violation may affect status accumulation is important, it is also 
crucial to consider the consequence of new information on the other type of performance, 
namely market performance (Shipilov and Li 2008).  
 
Status as a weak signal and its consequences for information processing  
While it appears from the previous evidence that in some circumstances market 
participants pay attention to status while updating their beliefs based on new information 
we still lack a formal model that explains the mechanism that maintains status’ salience 
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mechanism will also enable us to address the question if and how the status effects 
observed under uncertainty change as a result of new information. However, before 
advancing a formal explanation we need to take into account the fact that status as signal 
has two components. One is its content, or the likely message it transmits to interested 
audiences. The second is the accuracy of the signal.  
 
Content of the status signal 
In the current theory of status as signal the main emphasis is on the content aspect. 
The pattern of relationships in which an actor is embedded signals that an actor belongs 
to a certain status-quality strata (Podolny and Phillips 1996, Podolny 2001). Moreover, 
relationships serve as “access constraints, inhibiting contacts which could potentially 
alter perceptions [about the actors] by bringing them into conformance with changes in 
the underlying quality of products” (Podolny 1993). Because they have ties to distinct 
audiences it is quite unlikely that high status and low status actors will be often compared 
to each other. The consequence is the relative stability of status hierarchies based on 
seldom challenged perceived difference in quality across status levels.  
There are two main assumptions on which the familiar status effects under 
uncertainty are based. The first assumption is that the content of the status signal is 
mostly about the presence or absence of ties and the second is that observers rarely have 
access or use alternative sources of information. Indeed most of the existing literature 
works with these assumptions. Under uncertainty investors are attentive to the existence 
of ties between the focal firm and third parties to make inferences about the underlying 
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actors” (Podolny 2001). Firms with the most prominent endorsers will be the ones with 
the highest status and of best perceived quality. Once these endorsers start pulling out the 
firm is losing status and consequently its quality is thought to decrease, too.    
There is a second aspect to endorsement though. In the same way a pattern of ties 
creates a status profile for a firm when uncertainty is high, the opinions of the partners 
tied to the firm create a specific expectation about the firm’s performance inside a status 
stratum. Unfortunately, this aspect is often hidden in most status research which tends to 
look at the existence of ties, but not at the statements of the endorsers (but see Stewart 
2005). However, in reality endorsers often offer additional information about a firm. 
They motivate their choice and offer predictions about the future prospects of a firm and 
in doing so they set specific expectations for each firm. “Quality is not something that 
arises automatically from the inherent characteristics of the object, but rather something 
that is externally imposed” by third parties who reconstruct the reality for interested 
audiences (Hsu 2006). Different evaluators contribute to the legitimacy of an 
organization and by endorsing it they create specific expectations about what the 
organizations should be or how it should perform (Rao 1994, Ruef and Scott 1998, 
Zuckerman and Kim 2006, Sauder 2008). For example, while endorsement by the most 
prestigious partners indicates that the focal firm is in the highest status strata, i.e. in the 
strata with the highest average quality, the specific level of quality for each firm is 
indicated by the statements of the endorsers.     
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A second dimension of a signal is its accuracy. Because most signals are weak, 
their message will be credible with some probability only. Although the loose linkage 
between status and quality has been amply discussed (Podolny 1993, 2005) there has 
been little discussion about the accuracy of the status signal. So far we have evidence that 
the degree of reliance on status as a signal of quality varies with the states of the world, 
such that status becomes more important as the uncertainty increases (e.g. Higgings and 
Gulati 2003). However, so far nobody directly raised the question whether the perceived 
accuracy of the status signal varies across status levels. More precisely, existing studies 
which prove that higher advantages accrue to higher status positions implicitly assume 
that this is the result of the differences in the mean of the quality distribution for each 
status level. In other words, choosing a high status firm means drawing from a 
distribution whose mean is higher than that from which a low firm is chosen. If the 
variance of the two distributions is different is of little consequence and therefore there is 
no need to theorize this aspect. In this paper I explicitly approach this aspect and assume 
that the perceived accuracy of the status signal is not constant across status levels. 
The argument that the perceived accuracy of the status signal is higher for high 
status firms is congruent with statements and evidence from existing literature. For 
example Blau (1964) suggests that opinions of high status actors are considered more 
credible, and therefore carry more weight. Similarly, organizations tied to the most 
important institutions are seen as more reliable and accountable (Hannan and Freedman 
1989, Baum and Oliver 1992). Podolny and Stuart (1995) argue that the more prominent 
the firms which sponsor an innovation in a technological niche are, the stronger the belief 
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Hybels (1999) conclude that actors with the most prestigious endorsements are more 
successful because, among other reasons, their endorsers are the most credible. The same 
idea is emphasized by Stewart (2005) who describes how in determining the quality of 
new members of an online community of software developers a higher weight is put on 
the opinion of the high status endorsers.  
Similarly, in this paper the higher perceived accuracy of the signal for high status 
firms is a result of their endorsement by prestigious endorsers (star financial analysts).   
Because not all opinions carry the same weight the more prominent the endorsers are the 
higher the belief in accuracy of their opinion. In this respect, a high status position, i.e. 
endorsement by highly regarded partners, is a promise that the level of performance is not 
very different from the one agreed on by endorsers. This does not mean that any moment 
a high status firm will outperform all firms of a lesser status. However, what the 
endorsers of high status firms promise is not that the performance is always at its highest 
point, but that they are able to offer a signal of a higher precision.  
 
New Information and Reaction 
Expanding the content of the status signal and considering the accuracy of the 
signal is critical for understanding the moderating role of status in processing new 
information about firm performance. While it may seem obvious that high status actors 
receive more attention in general (Haveman 1993, Ocasio 1997, Podolny and Stuart 1995, 
Stuart 1998), the question of what exactly the market participants pay attention to at 
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answered yet.  
I propose an attention switch hypothesis. My proposition is that under uncertainty 
the market is attentive mostly to the content of status as a signal of the firm’s quality and 
this is what explains why under uncertainty high status firms are more likely to be 
selected by resource holders. However, as new information about the actual performance 
becomes public, any significant difference between the new information and the existing 
standards set by the endorsers represents a surprise which triggers a deliberate sense-
making process in which the conditions surrounding the production of the surprise are 
reconsidered. Unexpected outcomes are more likely to trigger attempts to explain them 
than expected outcomes (Weiner1985) and such an adjustment is in line with the rational 
tendency to integrate new information in resolving apparent conflicts with the aim to 
further exercise control over the world (Kelley 1971). Because the expected accuracy of 
the signal is higher for the firms with the most prestigious partners, performance surprises 
are more likely to be more consequential for firms with prestigious partners (high status 
firms) than for firms with less prominent partners (low status firms).  
 
Status Moderation and Alternative Hypothesis 
The following model attempts to formalize the likely reactions to surprises. If the 
status of a firm (S) is determined by the prominence of its endorsers, then the accuracy of 
the status as signal of quality varies across status strata such that the perceived accuracy 
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perceived variance of the status signal as a function of status:
 4
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Now we can start discussing what happens if some new information arrives. Let us 
assume that before some relevant information about the firm performance become public 
the market believes that the current market value of a firm is V and in the light of the new 
information the value must be reassessed. If status plays no role in processing the new 
information the market reaction will reflect a change in value in the direction of the news 
(positive or negative surprise). In other words, the reaction will only be a function of the 
sign of the news. This is the null hypothesis.  
However, if the market is also attentive to the accuracy of the status signal, as 
suggested, the surprise is defined in relation with the accuracy of the status signal and 
therefore we should see a further adjustment which is function of status, too. More 
precisely, because the magnitude of the reaction is directly related to perceived accuracy 
of the signal before the event, I propose that the magnitude of the reaction will be a 
function of status.  
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Based on the above expression we can develop the prediction concerning the 
effect of status on market reaction. 
                                                 
4 It is easy to see that the lowest perceived variance occurs for the highest status position. In other words, 
the confidence in the accuracy of the signal is high for firms of high status. The level of status from which 
confidence in the status signal is significant is to be determined empirically and probably depends on the 
particularities of the setting. However, for the highest status strata the confidence is always at its highest.  
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the status of the firm.  
 
Scope and mechanism clarification 
Before moving to the empirical setting a clarification is needed concerning the 
generalizability of the above proposition and the conditions which limit its applicability. 
In order for the above proposition to hold we need the environment to be uncertain so that 
signals become important. In other words, there should be a tension between the 
underlying quality of a firm and the day by day performance. In addition, there should 
exist at least a group of actors who are believed to have superior knowledge about the 
firm and whose endorsement of the firm performs a signaling role. It should be noted 
here that these actors need not be a totally different category such as film critics (Hsu 
2006) or financial analysts (Zuckerman 1999). They can also be organizations of the 
same type with the one being evaluated providing that a hierarchical pattern inside the 
field can be established (Podolny 1993). The key issue is that their opinion should be 
considered valuable and be paid attention to. Also, in order for the news to be acted on by 
investors, the news should be relevant for them in the sense of being consequential for 
their wealth or other form of utility. Finally, the investors should have a way to act 
relatively quickly when the information becomes public.  
An advantage of the model is that it is able to offer predictions for different types 
of actions, including norm deviation, as long as the boundary conditions are satisfied. In 
addition, the model is useful for analyzing negative events regardless of their being 
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5), therefore providing a more general 
framework.
6 Moreover, the model is also able to predict reactions to positive news. 
Surprisingly, no study to my knowledge has undertaken the task of explicating the likely 
impact of status on the way positive information about the firm performance is processed, 
although Merton’s (1968) “Mathew Effect” suggests an outcome similar to the one 
predicted by the model. However, while Mathew Effect would predict a shift upward for 
positive performance of high status actors compared to the impact of positive 
performance of low status actors, the present model states that the disproportionate 
rewards to status consistently appear when the positive results are surprises. This does not 
invalidate Merton’s proposition, but rather specify that the likelihood of seeing a Mathew 
Effect is higher for surprises.   
 
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING AND HYPOTHESIS 
Earnings Announcements and Surprises  
I test the proposition on a sample of well established American firms which make 
announcements concerning their performance during the previous fiscal year. The data is 
described in detail in the next section. For the purpose of this analysis I consider only 
earnings announcements, which report earnings per share (EPS). EPS is calculated as net 
income available for the common stock, divided by the number of outstanding shares. 
                                                 
5 Fiske and Taylor 1984 claim that high status actors are better prepared to understand the contingencies of 
their actions and their trespassing is intentional. 
 
6 Unfortunately, in many of the previous studies with results both in line or different from the prediction of 
the current model the scope conditions are problematic. First, in most of the cases the expectations are set 
by the experimenter and not by a credible expert. Also, in most cases the status of the actors is not 
established by the public, but assumed by the experimenter. Finally, the information about the actors’ 
performance has little consequence on the participants in the experiment.  
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which all market participants focus the greatest attention (Graham et al. 2005). Earnings 
announcements are compulsory for all public firms in the US. At the time of the 
announcement there exists a market consensus for the value of the EPS which captures 
the market expectation with respect to the firm’s performance.  Most often the consensus 
is a number or an interval, but in a more general sense it represents a belief of what the 
earnings should be, based on the evaluations of sell-side analysts who cover the firm. 
Compared to the market consensus a firm may report “surprises”, either positive (when 
the actual EPS is higher than the one predicted by analysts and in which case it is said 
that the firm beats expectations) or negative (when actual EPS is below predictions). In 
addition, a surprisingly high number of firms deliver EPS in line with the expectations 
(Degeorge, Patel, Zeckhauser 1999, Matsumoto 2002).  
A number of reasons make this setting appropriate for studying the moderating 
effect of status on news. First, stock markets are characterized by high uncertainty which 
makes mediation critical (Zuckerman 1999). Second, they are environments where the 
investors have both long and short term preferences. This creates a tension between the 
long term quality signaled by status and the current market value. Third, there exists at 
least one group of specialists (financial analysts) who are thought to have superior 
knowledge about the quality of the firms which they cover. Fourth, earnings 
announcements are events with clear meaning for all relevant market participants. In 
addition, they are events that happen to all firms. This feature is very important because it 
eliminates the self selection bias. Also, the information released on this occasion is 
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have the ability to react quickly to the news by buying or selling stock.    
However, earnings announcements are not without critics. Firms have been often 
criticized for manipulating either the actual earnings or the market expectation. These 
practices are justified by the fear that negative results can have dramatic consequences 
such as bad performance of the stock and negative publicity (Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 
2002, Matsumoto 2002). Negative surprises can postpone or stop investment plans, 
reduce the amount of borrowing that a firm may take, trigger the dismissal of firm’s 
managers and increase the likelihood of litigations (Skinner 1997). Although the concerns 
about earnings accuracy are legitimate, they bear little consequence for the current 
analysis which is concerned with testing if the status of the firm has a mediating impact 
on the effect of the news about its stock. In this analysis I take the realities of the market 
as given and I consider only the reaction to the EPS announcement. Although they are 
considered noisy, earnings announcements have been proven to carry enough information 
to generate visible and statistically significant market reactions (Bamber 1986). Some 
recent evidence suggests that the informativeness of the earnings has even increased since 
the Regulation Fair Disclosure became effective in October 2000 (Lazer 2004) even for 
firms which engage in income smoothing (Tucker and Zarowin 2006). At the limit, these 
concerns demonstrate the importance of earnings forecast and explain why a significant 
number of CFOs are willing to give up economic value in order to ensure smooth 
earnings (Graham et al. 2005).  
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  According to the working definition established above the status of the firm is a 
function of the prominence of its endorsers. In order for this status hierarchy to be 
consequential, the opinion of the endorser should be meaningful to the resource holders. 
For this endorsers must posses certain characteristics. They must be knowledgeable 
specialists with access to more information than the typical market participant and the 
ability to compare the prospects of different firms (Scott and Ruef 1998, Stuart, Hoang 
and Hybels 1999) in order to decide whom to endorse. Also, their support for a firm 
should have a reputational component (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels 1999) meant to ensure 
the potential investor that whenever a significant fall in the quality of the firm occurs, the 
endorsers will signal it. In addition, there should be some meaningful ranking that 
arranges them from the most to the least prominent, based on some criteria that the 
majority of the investors subscribe to.   
  Financial analysts fit this profile. In the current study I will focus on sell side 
analysts who typically work for full service investment banks. They are specialists who 
conduct research on publicly traded companies and make recommendations on their 
securities. Although they are not the only source of opinion about a company, their view 
is widely followed by all big investors. While many of the large money management 
institutions have their own buy-side analysts they still rely heavily on the reports of sell-
side analysts for a number of reasons. First, analysts have regular contacts with the 
company and therefore they have more access to information than the typical market 
actor. Second, even though a good deal of information about a company is made public in 
conference calls and media announcements, their deeper knowledge of the firm makes 
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industries they are able to assess not only the prospects of the focal firm, but also 
compare it with its competitors and provide information about the relative position of the 
company in its industry.  
The way analysts pick the stock for coverage is also relevant. They look for 
companies which have long term favorable prospects and are likely to be in the market 
for a while.
7 “Good stocks make a good analyst” states Richard Sherlund, Goldman 
Sachs’ star analyst for enterprise software (Institutional Investor 2000). This does not 
mean that at every moment these companies are going to be top performers – and the 
duty of the analysts is to be forthcoming about this. However, endorsement by highly 
regarded analysts conveys the message of a “better stock” in an indirect way. Banking 
relations aside, because the investors believe that star analysts have better information 
and industry knowledge they will attach more worth to firms covered by star analysts 
than to similar firms omitted from coverage.
8 This, combined with the fact that analysts 
are likely to drop coverage if they sense that the firm’s performance is decreasing 
dramatically (Eccles, Herz, Keegan and Phillips 2001) explains why investors end up 
paying more attention to firms covered by top rank analysts.  
                                                 
7 Initiating coverage is a relatively costly task. Usually it takes months to write the first research report on a 
new firm and to establish contacts with representatives of the firm. 
 
8 While an analyst may be covering a firm only because the firm is a good client of the bank does not 
represent a major problem in this paper. The status of a firm is function of its stock being endorsed by a 
number of analysts. More precisely, the highest status firms are indorsed by a large number of high rank 
analysts coming from different investment banks. Also, evidence exists that “analysts' allocations of effort 
across firms depend on their expectations of each firm's future performance” and that “analysts gather and 
disseminate less information for firms with poor future prospects” (McNichols and O’Brien 1997). The 
same idea was expressed by a star analyst interviewed by the author. 
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be ranked as the top analyst in the Institutional Investor’s (II) “All-American Research 
Team”. The ranking is the result of surveying representatives of major money 
management institutions in US and other key markets. Although all analysts receive a 
score, the big prize goes to the top three analysts in their industry whose name is made 
public. The positions are called 1
st, 2
nd and 3
rd Team. In addition, II publishes the names 
of the best up-and-coming analysts in each industry (Runner-up). Although a runner-up 
position brings recognition and increases the price of the analyst, it is considerably less 
important than the three star spots.
9 Both the regard and the credit that a star position 
brings to the analyst are extremely high. Star analysts are courted both by big brokerage 
houses, who hire them for higher wages (Eccles and Crane 1988) and by firms who want 
to become visible to big investors (Krigman, Shaw and Womack 2001, Reingold 2006). 
At the limit, large deals cannot go through easily without the blessing of a star analyst.
10      
  These features of the star analysts make them veritable “status makers”. A 
majority of money managers rely on the opinion of star analysts, mostly because of their 
wide industry knowledge and access to firms’ management (see for example Institutional 
Investor survey results 2006). The belief in the superior insight of star analysts is proved 
for example by prices changing more as a result of changes in star analyst 
recommendation (Stickel). Star analysts are especially good at arranging meetings 
between investors and firms managers (McClellan 2008) which also contributes to the 
                                                 
9 Details about the survey methodology and the results are published yearly by the Institutional Investor 
Magazine. For an example see Institutional Investor October 2006.   
 
10 For example, in his book on Wall Street research a former star analyst described the privatization of 
British Telecom and the fact that the British government would only hire banks with II-ranked telecom 
analysts (Reingold 2006). Similar examples are evoked by Cole (2001) who describes potential 
underwriters dumped at the last moment because their star analysts were not “sufficiently involved”.   
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more accurate forecasts and timely updates (Stickel 1992) which keep the companies on 
the investors’ radar. Star analysts are likely to create fads in the stock market by inducing 
other analysts to cover the same stock they cover (Rao, Greve, Davis 2001). 
Consequently, their perceived informational and knowledge differences influence the 
investors’ choices between firms covered by highly regarded analysts (high status firms) 
and firms covered by ordinary analysts (low status firms) (Adler 1985).  
 
Status measure 
The data used to construct the status of the firm come from several sources. I 
matched all the firms-year in my sample with the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) historical recommendations database where analysts’ forecasts are included. An 
analyst is counted as covering a firm when she publishes at least one earnings forecast or 
recommendation for that firm during the relevant fiscal year. Because of some recent 
concerns about the reliability of the data in these files (Ljungqvist, Maloy and Marston 
2007)
  I also used Bloomberg Equity ANR function. More precisely, when an analyst 
featured as covering firm X in year t-1 and t+1 but not in t, I checked Bloomberg to see if 
that was the case. For recent years I used additional sources such as companies’ websites 
to fill out missing values as well as for robustness checks. To identify the star analysts I 
used the Institutional Investor Best Team file. Because of multiple common identification 
items in I/B/E/S, Bloomberg and Institutional Investor databases I managed to identify all 
star analysts.
11
                                                 
11 Where the databases indicated a team of analysts with one of them being a II star I assigned the firm to 
the star analyst.   
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function of the prominence of the analysts who cover the firm. First, as discussed above, 
the position of the analysts in the II All-American Team is a clear indicator of her 
prominence. Second, the number of reports and recommendations issued about a firm is a 
good estimator for the regard the analysts accords to a specific firm comparative to its 
peers. To address the first aspect I assign weights proportional to the position in the II 
ranking ( ). Ai w
12 In order to address the second issue, I accounted for the attention 
accorded by the analyst to a firm the following way. For each star analyst I calculated the 
maximum number of recommendations issued in a year for a firm, and for each firm 
covered by the analyst I calculated a weight by dividing the number of recommendations 
for the focal firm to the maximum number of recommendations issued for a competitor in 
the same year. Finally, the status score of the firm each year is  
∑ ∑ =
j j
j
i
Ai RAi
RAi
w S
) max(
    (3) 
where   are the corresponding weight attached to an analyst of rank i, RAj is the 
number of recommendations issued by an analyst of rank i for the focal firm, and 
Ai w
                                                                                                                                                 
 
12 I assign ¾ of the weight to the first three star analysts such that the first one receives half of it and the 
other half is divided equally between the 2
nd and the 3
rd. The rest of ¼ is divided such that the runner up 
receives half of it and the rest is divided 2/3
rd to unranked analysts from top ten investment banks and 1/3
rd 
to all other unrated analysts. (This is approximately equivalent to assigning a score of 9 to the analyst in the 
1
st Team, and scores of 4.5 to analysts in 2
nd and 3
rd Teams, 2.5 to runner-ups, 2 to analysts who work at 
one of the top 10 brokerage houses as counted in the II survey and 0.5 to all other analysts and dividing by 
23.) If an analyst is ranked more than once, I use her highest rank. I discussed the weights with a number of 
current and former analysts and all agreed that singling out the first ranks is realistic. In previous analyses 
all unrated analysts, regardless of their affiliation, were assigned the same weight. The results did not differ 
significantly from the ones presented here. Also, in previous analyses I did not weight by the intensity of 
coverage. The results are significant with that specification, too. However, accounting differently for 
analysts from top rated banks seems to be more in line with specialists’ opinion and including the intensity 
of the coverage is closer to the reality described by analysts. For an illustration of the status calculation see 
the Appendix.  
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competitor. The summation inside teams is necessary because a firm may be covered by 
more than one star analyst from each team. This is particularly true for firms which 
operate in multiple industries or whose products are very complex.
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DATA AND METHOD 
The Sample  
The working sample combines Fortune 500 firms and firms which have featured 
on the list of “Most Admired Companies” published by Fortune magazine since 1997. 
The main reason for including firms from the second list is the fact that, although 
different in size, they share with Fortune 500 an ample level of analyst coverage and 
media attention. For each year since 1997 I considered all publicly traded companies on 
the two lists. As an illustration of the turnover over time, out of the companies listed in 
1997 as Fortune 500 296 of them are on the list in 2005. On the Most Admired list 239 
companies from 1997 are on the list in 2005, too. Firms appear in the sample for their 
entire life since 1997 through 2005. A restriction is that the firms in the dataset should be 
in operation for at least 3 years. This means that firms which were on the lists in 1997 
and were acquired or went private through 2000 are dropped from the database. Also, 
new public firms which went though IPO after 2002 (such as Google) are not included in 
the sample. The initial panel consists of 6086 firms-year from 1998 through 2005. 
                                                 
13 For example Accenture is covered by two 1
st Team analysts, one specialized in IT- Consulting and one 
specialized in Business and Professional Services (II 2002, 2003). Same is trued for IBM covered by three 
1
st Team analysts (IT Hardware PC and Enterprise and Semiconductors). A less glamorous case is Pactiv, 
specialized in packaging and light building products, covered in 2004 by two 1
st Team analysts and in 
addition by a rank 2 and a runner up.  
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Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT shrank the sample further. The final panel consists of 
4799 firm-year cases. An analysis of the missing data shows that smaller firms are more 
likely to have missing data on CRSP and COMPUSTAT files. Table 1 shows the 
distribution by year and the percent of overlap between the two lists.  
There are several advantages of this sample. First, it includes companies which 
are likely to be around for a longer while and which can be tracked over time. Therefore, 
if status is correlated with survival rates (Rao 1994), the fact that I find evidence of the 
role of status in this sample represents a more conservative test. The time interval is also 
appropriate for testing the above hypotheses. The data covers a period characterized by 
high uncertainty in the stock market, including the internet bubble, corporate scandals, 
and the passing of a number of regulations meant to make the markets more transparent 
(e.g. Regulation FD in October 2000). It is also a period when the star analyst system is 
fully institutionalized and recognized by all market participants.  
 
 
Measuring the surprise and the market reaction  
 
Surprise:  Following the convention in accounting and financial literature an 
earning surprise represents a departure of the actual EPS from the analysts’ consensus. If 
the difference is positive, the surprise is positive. Else, we have a negative surprise. 
Results in line with the consensus represent the reference category. From the I/B/E/S data 
I computed the analysts’ consensus as the mean of the analysts’ forecasts, using the last 
Daniela Lup, Chicago GSB        28value of the forecast before the actual earnings but the minimum and the maximum value. 
The assumption is that if an analyst does not update her forecast, she is confident that her 
forecast is correct.
14 To assess the surprise I calculate the difference between the actual 
EPS reported by the firm and consensus and scale it by the standard deviation of the 
forecasts. The cases in which the result is within one standard deviation are considered in 
line with the expectation. Surprises are outside the interval. Because of the importance of 
star endorsers I checked that their forecasts are inside the one standard deviation interval. 
They are. This is not surprising in the light of increasing evidence of analysts hoarding 
around the star analysts opinions (Rao, Greve, Davis 2001).   
 
Reaction: To measure the market reaction to earnings surprise I use the 
cumulative abnormal return on the stock of the firm around the date of its issuing the 
actual earning results. I estimate a simple market model  mt i i it R R β α + =  for the interval 
200 to 30 days preceding the actual earning release. I approximate the market return   
with the daily return on S&P 500 (CRSP). I calculate the abnormal return using the 
standard approach described McWilliams and Siegel (1997). I calculate the cumulative 
abnormal return over an event window starting one day before the earnings 
announcement and running through the 3
mt R
rd day after the event day. The cumulative 
abnormal return reflects the net change in returns over one trading week.  
 
                                                 
14 This is very close to the consensus forecast number provided by I/B/E/S (correlation 0.903). However, 
the I/B/E/S consensus is calculated two weeks before the actual earnings announcement and therefore last 
minute information and updates are not likely to be included. The measure used in this study accounts 
better for the market expectation at the date of the announcement.  
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fiscal year of the firm does not perfectly overlap with the period for which the 
Institutional Investor calculates rankings, I construct the status in the current year as an 
average of the absolute status in the previous and current year. In order to make the 
interpretation of interaction effects easier, i.e. have values of zero for status, I subtracted 
the minimum value of status in each year. To normalize the status I divided the difference 
by the maximum value of status in each year. Consequently for each firm-year status has 
a value in the interval [0,1].  
 
Control variables: A review of the extant research in finance and accounting 
suggests a number of variables which may impact on the level of return on stock. 
Although the existent evidence shows that the sign of the result is more important that it 
magnitude (Bartov, Givoly, Hayn 2002), I control for the difference between actual EPS 
and market consensus. I control for the average trading volume around the announcement 
date and for the level of return in the period previous to earnings release. Also, I include I 
dummy variable to account for firms which do not issue any earnings forecasts or 
warnings. Logarithm of sales proxies for size and asset growth is an additional measure 
of financial performance. I control for negative profits, regardless of them being expected 
by the market or not and for current year earnings being lower than last year’s. I account 
for the age of the firm and for growth vs. value stock by including the book per market 
ratio. I included an indicator for firms which stop existing as stand alone entities because 
of mergers or acquisitions. I control for market memory by including a dummy variable 
for firms which provided negative surprises last year, too. I include the percentage of 
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earnings. Other controls for future performance expectations include: a dummy which 
indicate if the firm issues guidance for the next year at the same time with their releasing 
the current year actual results, along with an indicator which takes value 1 if the 
prediction for next year is bellow the results of the current year, and the difference 
between the mean recommendation made by analysts after and before the 
announcement.
15 To proxy for visibility or high level of preoccupation with a particular 
stock I include the sum of all estimates made during the fiscal year by all analysts. A 
dummy variable controls for firms which are on the S&P 500 list. I also control if the 
firm has been nominated on the “Most Admired Companies” list. I account for the 
popularity of the firm by calculating the relative media coverage.
16 Finally industry and 
year dummies and the value of the consumer price index in the month of the reporting are 
included.   
 
Estimation 
  To test the hypothesis that reaction to new information about performance is 
moderated by the status of the firm I estimate the cumulative return around the earnings 
release date as a function of the sign of the surprise, a status function, and an interaction 
term.  
                                                 
15 To calculate the mean difference between analysts’ recommendation after and before the announcement I 
allocated scores of 3, 2, 1 for buy, hold (neutral), sell respectively. I calculated the mean of all 
recommendations dated 45 days before the announcement and the mean of all recommendations issued 30 
days after the announcement and subtracted the latter from the first.  
 
16 To construct the variable relative media coverage I use Factiva search “atleast3 NAME OF THE FIRM” 
and the source TMNB (Main News and Business Publications) for a window of 3 months before the 
earnings announcements date. I divided the total number of articles for firm i by the maximum number of 
articles found for the other firms in its industry for the same interval in the same year.  
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To address the concern that abnormal returns and other time-dependent covariates may be 
correlated across periods I use the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) method of 
estimation over the more popular cluster specific method. One of the advantages of using 
the GEE method for the present data is that it produces robust estimators accounting for 
both between-firm and within-firm variation. In addition, GEE solutions are consistent 
and asymptotically normal even when the correlation pattern is misspecified (for a review 
of GEE method in organizational research see Ballinger 2004).  I use the “xtgee” routine 
in STATA 9.0. I consider the link function that connects the outcome to the covariates as 
“identity”, the distribution of the outcome variable “Gaussian” and I use an 
“exchangeable” (equal correlation) adjustment.
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.   
Results 
Table 2 contains the descriptive characteristics of the variables included in the 
analysis. It is split into two parts, A and B, for categorical and continuous variable, 
respectively.  
  Table 2A and Table 2B  
On average, about a third of the firms have actual EPS below market expectation, a figure 
very much in line with findings from other studies on different samples of firms 
(Matsumoto 2002). About 40 percent have positive surprises.  
Table 3 includes correlations between main variables. Table 4 present the results 
of the base equation which includes factors that have been considered in the existing 
                                                 
17 For robustness I considered OLS with robust standard errors. The results are very similar with the ones 
reported for the GEE.  
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of little importance to the present study are in line with previous research in finance and 
accounting. Similar to existent evidence, firms with earnings below market expectation 
have significantly lower returns, while firms which deliver positive surprises encounter a 
higher return on their stock (cumulative return effect of -1.473 for negative surprises vs. 
1.129 for positive surprises). As the volume of trading in the current period increases, the 
return on stock decreases (coefficient -0.07). Value stock trades at a discount (coefficient 
-.06) and firms with negative profits are also penalized (coefficient -1.37). In addition, 
the more positive the change in the analysts consensus the higher the return (coefficient 
1.309). Interestingly, the effect of past year performance on current return is not 
significant, rather firms are judged based on the current year performance only. This 
result is in line with the widely accepted short-term orientation of securities markets.  
Table 5 presents the effects of status. I only include the effects of interest for this 
paper. All the controls presented in Table 4 are also included and their effects remain 
significant, as described above. In a preliminary analysis I considered the interaction 
between surprise and other significant independent variables to check for confounding 
effects, but I found none.
18  Table 5 Model 1 shows that the main effect of surprises is 
significant. More precisely, for the typical firm, beating the market expectation translates 
into an additional return of 1.139 while a negative surprise reduces the return by 1.461. 
Status has no mediating effect. The result shows that when more precise information 
about the firm performance becomes available, the positive effect of status disappears 
(Hypothesis 1b). 
                                                 
18 For example Skinner and Sloan (2002) found that the reaction to negative surprises is greater for growth 
stocks.  
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model the type of news (positive or negative) has the expected effect, while the 
coefficients for status effects are insignificant. The interaction between status and 
surprise confirms Hypothesis 2 that information is processed differently for firms of high 
status compared to firms of lower status. Figure 2 shows the moderating effect of status 
on the return of the stock. At low levels status does not moderate the effect of type of 
surprises (the linear interaction between surprise and status is statistically insignificant 
for either type of news). At higher status levels the effect of status translates into an 
increase in reaction such that the stock of the highest status firms with positive surprises 
enjoy an excess return of about 3.5% while the stock of high status firms with negative 
surprises incurs an additional penalty of about 4.8%.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper shows that arrival of relevant new information about the firm 
performance represent breaking points at which the status effects we are used to see 
under uncertainty change. Status moderates the response to surprising news, but is 
inconsequential when the news has been anticipated. The results of the empirical analysis 
confirm that the reaction to earnings related surprises is disproportionate for high status 
firms compared to low status firms. In addition to being difficult to theorize in other 
frameworks, the result is also puzzling from the point of view of classic financial theory 
(efficient market hypothesis) which has been the preferred framework for modeling 
market response to corporate news (Fama 1970, 1991) and which predicts reaction to the 
type of news only (i.e. negative vs. positive). Even though some studies draw attention to 
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(LaPorta 1996, Skinner and Sloan 2002) they do not spell out the mechanisms 
responsible for producing those errors (Hand 2002) and therefore cannot offer a general 
framework for analyzing reactions to new information. Studies which explore 
psychological mechanisms focus mostly on investors’ over confidence based on their 
biased perceptions about private information (e.g. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 
1998). Yet, in most cases, the status of an actor is a relatively public signal.     
The paper was motivated by the observation that although the effects of status 
under uncertainty are thoroughly researched, we still know very little about the role of 
status when information about performance becomes public. This gap is surprising in the 
light of an increased availability of information that characterizes almost all fields of 
activity. By documenting the moderating effect of status on performance information the 
paper contributes to the resolution of the debate concerning high status advantage and 
liability. Although both situations are documented by the existing research on status, it is 
still not clear how they relate to one another. Existing literature documents that high 
status actors are sometimes sanctioned more than their peers, although not necessary for 
their performance but mostly for their behaviour (Phillips and Zuckerman). On the other 
hand Merton’s account of the distribution of rewards in the scientific community suggests 
that high status actors receive higher recognition than their peers of lower status for 
similar scientific contributions. However, the two competing predictions have not been 
tested within the same data set, and therefore it is not easy to tease out the effect of status 
from the specificity of the setting. Even more, the predictions have been tested on 
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it is not clear whether the same logic applies to both of them.  
This paper proposes a way to integrate the two disparate sets of findings by 
showing that there exists a single underlying mechanism responsible for producing them. 
The proposition is that interested audiences are more attentive to the actions and the 
performance of high status actors, but their attention is not constantly focused on the 
same parameter. Under uncertainty the market is attentive to status as a signal of quality 
or as insurance offered by the focal actor’s relations that the actor is going to deliver 
performance within a certain range. The more prestigious the relations are, the higher the 
status of the firm and the higher the confidence in the signal. Once new information 
becomes public there is a shift in attention from the content of the signal to the accuracy 
of the signal. In the process of verifying their expectations against the reality, investors 
will act on the information which is not in line with their expectations (surprises). 
Because the perceived accuracy of the signal is positively correlated with the status 
position the magnitude of the reaction to new information also depends on status. In other 
words, when the market sees a surprise from a high status firm from which they expected 
a more accurate signal they are more likely to react than when the surprise occurs with 
respect to a low status firm.   
In order to demonstrate these effects I relax one of the core assumptions of status 
theory, namely that the gap between status ordering and quality ordering is difficult to 
observe. My proposition is that while this is indeed likely to happen under prolonged 
uncertainty there are numerous instances in the strategy field in which new information 
becomes public and needs to be processed quickly. And for those instances we do not 
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are observed and how the market reacts.  
For empirical testing, my research question requires a setting in which 
information becomes public and interested parties are able to react quickly. If the 
discrepancy between status and quality remains private, the effect will be small or 
insignificant, if information is public, the effect will be substantial. Stock markets nicely 
fit these requirements. There are many similar settings. For example the model will be 
useful for analyzing changes in enrolment at high and low status schools after significant 
performance results (test scores, rate of university admission) become public. It can also 
be applied to analyzing job market outcomes for candidates with prestigious endorsers 
when their performance departs from expectations. On the other hand, the model is not 
appropriate for investigating news which diffuse slowly and when the reaction time is 
delayed unless we can account in a very precise manner for intervening events which 
may interfere with the signal. Also, if the audience is not sensitive to the news the 
reaction will be very weak (Ager and Piskorski 2002).   
The study has its limitations and some of its assumptions, only implicit so far, 
need clarification. First, the definition of status used in this article – a function of 
affiliation with prestigious partners – although widely used it is not the only one 
(Ridgeway, Berger, social stratification). However, it is the most widely used in the 
strategic management literature to which the paper speaks. Moreover, some of the 
contributions made by this paper can also enrich the other perspectives. A second critique 
that may be raised is that although the theoretical model describes the moderating role of 
status the effects obtained in the empirical may be driven by some other phenomena such 
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explained somewhere else (Podolny 2005) I would like to briefly review it here. In 
general, studies of firm reputation show that reputation is constructed from pieces of 
information about previous performance (Fombrun and Shanley 1990, Shapiro 1983) 
with a great importance on financial measures (financial halo), while status is derived 
primarily from patterns of relationships. Even though the two concepts are certainly 
related, it is clear that the mechanisms by which they become salient are different. This 
suggests different ways of constructing expectations and updating information. In the 
case of reputation, the correlation between past and future performance is expected to be 
positive. In the case of status, the expectation is generated by the relationship pattern, and 
not by previous performance. A firm with excellent performance and prestigious 
endorsers will generate high expectations regardless. However, a firm with poor and 
average performance in the previous periods but endorsed by prominent partners will 
only generate high expectations under the status scenario. Similar for a firm with a good 
performance record but which fails to impress the most prestigious potential partners.
19  
Before concluding I would like to propose some directions for future research 
suggested by the results of this study. One possible question concerns the likely effects 
on the information that the firms decide to make public. This study proposes that once an 
event occurs the investor needs to interpret the meaning of the new information and 
integrate it with the previous knowledge. In the case of the firm, investors need to 
reassess the “fundamental value” of the firm. If social status magnifies the reaction to the 
                                                 
19 Another example in which future worth is function of the patterns of ties and not past performance is 
Middleton and Hanson’s (2003). They describe the scientific standing of two scientists as inversely 
correlated to the number and accuracy of their scientific discoveries. The reason of this paradoxical fact is 
the difference in the number and quality of ties that the two cultivated.    
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distort the fundamental value. This knowledge has implications for the way the firm 
decides to make information available to the investors and therefore may offer some 
answers to the puzzling communication behavior that characterizes today’s firms (i.e. 
inaccurate statements, postponing news etc). For example, a constant communication 
with the investors in which good news interrupts a stream of bad news may be the 
desirable strategy. It is of critical importance to understand the signals that the managers 
receive from financial markets. If these signals vary function of the type of information 
and the status of the firm distortions are likely to appear.  
Another question concerns the conditions surrounding the release of new 
information. Is for example a higher level of uncertainty at the time of information 
release magnifying the effects even further? Existing evidence from status theory and 
evidence about information procession and decision biases suggest that might be the case. 
An extension of this study will look at the likely effects of higher uncertainty at the time 
of earnings announcement. For firms which do not offer earnings forecasts and warnings 
the firm related uncertainty should be higher and consequently the status effects even 
larger. An analysis of those effects may provide insights in the debate about voluntary 
reporting and about incentives to misreporting.   
An intriguing question is what are the conditions which perpetuate the belief in 
the endorsers, despite the fact that they may err on times? The assumption in this study is 
that the investors generally believe that the Institutional Investor ranking is legitimate and 
that, although far from perfect, it is a relatively good indicator of the value of the analyst. 
Similar situations have been documented for other rankings (Sauder 2008). As a result, 
Daniela Lup, Chicago GSB        39even though a particular analyst is not very accurate in a couple of instances, the 
investors do not necessary see this as a total failure but rather as an instance in which the 
analyst’s knowledge of a specific firm is not as accurate as it should be. In the current 
setting the lack of accuracy does not have an immediate consequence for the analysts, but 
rather for the endorsed firm. However, it would be worth investigating under what 
conditions the endorser is sanctioned too.  
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Daniela Lup, Chicago GSB        44Table1: Firms Distribution per year since 1998 
 
 
FISCAL YEAR 
BEGINNING 
 
NUMBER OF FIRMS 
PERCENT IN BOTH 
FORTUNE 500 AND 
“MOST ADMIRED” 
1998 544 35.66 
1999 577 34.83 
2000 545 37.98 
2001 587 37.98 
2002 635 40.15 
2003 646 43.03 
2004 635 45.66 
2005 630 49.52 
Total Cases  4799   
 
 
Table 2A:  Frequency Distribution for Categorical Variables  
VARIABLES  
Percent of firms with EPS below market expectation  33.51 
Percent of firms with EPS above market expectation  40.11 
Percent of firms with negative profit  11.54 
Percent of firms in their last year as a distinct entity  1.00 
Percent of firms with EPS lower than last year’s  28.86 
Percent of firms offering lead forecast at the announcement time  52.26 
Percent of firms with EPS below market expectation last year  28.65 
Percent of firms with no EPS forecast  29.93 
 
Table 2B:  Means and Standard Deviations for Continuous Variables 
VARIABLE MEAN/  SDV 
Difference between actual EPS and market consensus   -.048   (.456) 
Ratio lead EPS/current EPS (for firms which offer lead forecast)  .657     (1.360) 
Lagged Return in the period previous to earnings release  .088     (2.828) 
Average trading volume in the interval of interest  2.912    (7.206) 
Logarithm Sales Volume   8.437     (1.198) 
Age of the firm (years)  27.205    (16.629) 
Book per Market Ratio  .042     (2.054) 
Asset Growth compared to last year  1.138    (.382) 
Percentage firms reporting negative results in the same month  .401     (.095) 
Status normalized  .282     (.187) 
Change in analysts’ recommendation   .010     (.471) 
Logarithm total number of analysts estimations   3.289    (.800) 
 
 
 
Daniela Lup, Chicago GSB        45Table 4: Base Equation: predicting return from variables not related to the status of the firm  
 
VARIABLES 
 
COEFFICIENT/ 
STD.DEV. 
Positive surprise  1.129   (.279)** 
Negative surprise  -1.473   (.284)** 
No Guidance  -.409      ( .243) 
Change in analysts’ consensus  1.309   (.231)** 
Average trade volume  -.070   (.021)** 
Lagged return  .819   (.055)** 
Age  -.007   (.007) 
Loss   -1.371  (.452)** 
Asset growth  .402   (.277) 
Log Sales  -.085   (.127) 
Book per Market ratio  -.063   (.006)** 
Last year in operation  -1.433  (1.349) 
Result worse than last year  .381   (.282) 
Percent negative surprises in  month of reporting  1.081  (1.568) 
Firm issues lead forecast  -.118   (.256) 
Ratio lead forecast per current result   .001    (.000)** 
CPI  -1.233  (.512)* 
Media coverage  -.467   (.511) 
Difference expected – actual EPS  .187    (.329) 
Lagged negative surprise  -.039   (.219) 
Most admired company   .025    (.286) 
Log Number of estimates  -.135   (.172) 
Intercept  1.102   (1.323) 
 Industry and year dummies are also included.  
**p<0.01 *p<0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniela Lup, Chicago GSB        46Table 5: The effect of Earning Surprise and Status on the cumulative abnormal return  
 
VARIABLES  
 
Model 1 
Status mediator 
Model 2 
Status moderator 
Main/ Simple effects     
Positive surprise  1.139   (.278)**  1.756   (.729)* 
Negative surprise  -1.461   (.285)**  -1.925   (.746)** 
Status   -.6315   (1.791)  -.480   (3.174) 
Status squared  2.010   (2.179)  2.168   (3.714) 
Interaction effects     
(Positive Surprise) x (Status)    -6.094   (3.901) 
(Positive Surprise) x (Status squared)    9.676    (4.627)* 
(Negative Surprise) x (Status)    6.310   (4.194) 
(Negative Surprise) x (Status squared)    -11.194  (5.113)* 
 
 
Figure 1: Moderating Effect of Status on New Information about Firm Performance 
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For an illustration, here is the calculation of the status score for the IBM in 2002. The firm 
was covered by 25 distinct analysts, out of whom three were in the 1
st Team, three in the 
2
nd and 3
rd team and two were runners up. For the analysts in the 1
st Team, two had three 
updates for IBM compared to a maximum of four for a competitor, and the other star 
analyst offered only one update on IBM compared to a maximum of three for a competitor. 
The partial score coming from team 1 is  )
3
1
4
3
4
3
(
8
3
+ + . The three analysts in the 2
nd and 3
rd 
team had three, three and four updates for IBM, compared to a maximum of four. Their 
partial score is therefore:  )
4
4
4
3
4
3
(
16
3
+ + . The two runners up have their largest number of 
updates for IBM and consequently a contribution of 1/4. In addition, five analysts from top 
ten banks cover IBM, their contribution being  )
4
1
4
1
2
1
4
1
2
1
(
12
1
+ + + + . There are also 12 
unranked analysts. By summing up the contribution of each team we obtain a status score 
of 2.052. This score puts IBM in the 23
rd position in 2002 among all firms in the database. 
Here are the top and bottom ten for 2002.  
 
Highest Score    Lowest score 
General Electric     4.708    Triarc  0.083 
Verizon      4.437    Standard Register  0.083 
Oracle Systems      4.395    Cone Mills    0.041 
PeopleSoft       4.312    Gevity HR  0.041 
General Mills  4.187    Kellwood  0.041 
Motorola    4.020    Hughes Supply  0.041 
EMC    4.020    Idacorp  0.041 
Kohl's      3.937    Mead  0.041 
Nucor     3.895    Thor Industries     0.041 
Freeport-McMoRan  3.762    World Fuel Services    0.041 
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